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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by 
preliminarily enjoining Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 
d/b/a Las Vegas Sporting News ("LVSN"), from using the 
phrase "Sporting News" in connection with its weekly 
sports-betting publication under the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c) ("FTDA" or "Act"). 
The district court concluded that Times Mirror Magazines 
Inc., owner of the federally registered mark "The Sporting 
News," was likely to succeed on the merits of its dilution 
claim against LVSN, because the mark was "famous" in its 
niche market and LVSN's use of the title Las Vegas Sporting 
News on its publication diluted the Times Mirror's mark by 
blurring its distinctiveness. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over the dilution 
claims pursuant to 15 U.S.C. S 1121(a) and 28 U.S.C. 
S 1338. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(a)(1). This appeal by LVSN was timelyfiled under 
Rule 4, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
LVSN contends that the district court erred by granting 
Times Mirror preliminary injunctive relief because Times 
Mirror failed to establish a likelihood of success on the 
merits of its dilution claim or immediate irreparable harm. 
We must decide whether the district court erred by holding 
that (a) the mark "The Sporting News" was famous in the 
sports periodicals market; (b) LVSN's use diluted the 
strength of Times Mirror's mark by blurring its 
distinctiveness and (c) Times Mirror's 15-month delay in 
bringing suit did not preclude a finding that LVSN's use 
would immediately cause irreparable harm to Times Mirror. 
 
In reviewing the grant or denial of a preliminary 
injunction, we consider the following: 
 
       1. The law has entrusted the power to grant or 
       dissolve an injunction to the discretion of the trial 
       court in the first instance, and not to the appellate 
       court. 
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       2. Unless the trial court abuses that discretion, 
       commits an obvious error in applying the law or 
       makes a serious mistake in considering proof, the 
       appellate court must take the judgment of the trial 
       court as presumptively correct. 
 
       3. This limited review is necessitated because the 
       grant or denial is almost always based on an 
       abbreviated set of facts, requiring a delicate 
       balancing of the probabilities of ultimate success at 
       final hearing with the consequences of immediate 
       irreparable injury which could possibly flow from 
       the denial of preliminary relief. 
 
       4. In exercising its limited review of the grant or 
       denial of preliminary injunctive relief, the appellate 
       court asks: (a) Did the movant make a strong 
       showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits? (b) 
       Did the movant show that, without such relief, it 
       would be irreparably injured? (c) Would the grant 
       of a preliminary injunction substantially have 
       harmed other parties interested in the proceedings? 
       (d) Where lies the public interest? 
 
       5. The applicant for a preliminary injunction bears 
       the burden of establishing that a right to such 
       injunctive relief and that irreparable injury will 
       result to him of it is not granted. Moreover, we 
       have emphasized the elementary principle that a 
       preliminary injunction shall not issue except under 
       a showing of irreparable injury. 
 
A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515, 525 (3d Cir. 1976); 
see Loretangeli v. Critelli, 853 F.2d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
I. 
 
In 1886, the phrase "The Sporting News" was granted 
federal trademark registration and since that time has been 
the banner headline on a weekly publication, entitled The 
Sporting News. The mark's present owner, Times Mirror 
Magazines, Inc., publishes The Sporting News and operates 
an internet website devoted to its publication at 
<http://www.sportingnews.com>. 
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The Sporting News provides its readers with information 
on baseball, basketball, football and hockey, and has a 
weekly circulation of approximately 540,000 in the United 
States and Canada. The Sporting News does not provide 
any information on gambling, because Times Mirror 
"believe[s] that there is a portion of the population that is 
adamantly opposed to gambling and that they would not 
look favorably on any of [its] products if they thought [the 
magazine was] promoting gambling in any way." D. Ct. Op. 
at 2 (alteration in original). The magazine is advertised on 
television, in direct mail solicitations, in promotions and 
occasionally on the radio. It is typically sold for $2.99, but 
nine special content issues are sold each year for $3.99. 
Over the last several years, Times Mirror has invested 
millions of dollars in The Sporting News in an attempt to 
improve the quality of its magazine and to increase 
readership. 
 
LVSN publishes Las Vegas Sporting News, which 
contains articles, editorials and advertisements on sports 
wagering "for the sports gaming enthusiasts or individuals 
that like to take a risk." App. at 41 (Testimony of LVSN 
publisher, Dennis Atiyeh). Las Vegas Sporting News is 
published 45 times a year and generally has a circulation 
of 42,000, but some special editions have had a circulation 
of up to 100,000. The publication is sold for $2.99 at 
several hundred newsstands across the country, but most 
copies are given away in gambling casinos free of charge. 
 
In 1997, LVSN publisher Dennis Atiyeh changed the 
name of his publication from Las Vegas Sports News to Las 
Vegas Sporting News. The publisher says that he changed 
the publication's title for two reasons: (1) the previous 
publisher of Las Vegas Sports News had a poor reputation, 
having fallen into disrepute with gambling casinos and (2) 
the term "sporting" more accurately reflected the 
publication's content, because the publication was a"sports 
gaming" publication, and not purely a "sports publication." 
D. Ct. Op. at 3. Atiyeh admits that at the time he changed 
the name of his publication, he was familiar with Times 
Mirror's publication The Sporting News. Since the 1997 
name change to Las Vegas Sporting News, circulation of the 
publication has increased, but not substantially. 
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Times Mirror first learned that LVSN was publishing Las 
Vegas Sporting News in August 1997. On September 24, 
1997, Times Mirror sent LVSN a cease and desist letter, 
which read in part: 
 
        It has recently come to my attention that your 
       company is marketing a sports magazine entitled Las 
       Vegas Sporting News. Apparently, this is a relatively 
       recent change, since the masthead page of your 
       magazine makes reference to Las Vegas Sports News, 
       stating, in part, that, "Las Vegas Sports News . . . is 
       published weekly . . . ." 
 
        . . . . It would appear that your company is 
       attempting to unlawfully appropriate the good will that 
       is associated with our federally registered trademark. 
 
        In view of the likelihood of consumer confusion, we 
       hereby demand that you (1) immediately cease and 
       desist from any further use of the term "Las Vegas 
       Sporting News," and (2) select a name to identify your 
       product that is not confusingly similar to our "The 
       Sporting News" trademark. 
 
App. at 263-264 (citations omitted). 
 
LVSN had not ceased using the phrase "Sporting News" 
in connection with its weekly publication. In October 1998, 
after settlement negotiations between Times Mirror and 
LVSN proved unsuccessful, Times Mirror retained Glenn 
Hauze, a private investigator in Pennsylvania, "to gain as 
much information as possible regarding the availability of 
the Las Vegas Sporting News," in anticipation of litigation. 
App. at 31. Hauze began his investigation by visiting three 
newsstands in or around Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania. The 
first newsstand he visited was in Plumsteadville, and it 
carried both The Sporting News and Las Vegas Sporting 
News. Las Vegas Sporting News "was up on the shelf with 
the other sporting magazines," but The Sporting News "was 
down amongst the tabloids." D. Ct. Op. at 6. The following 
day, Hauze found copies of Las Vegas Sporting News for 
sale at newsstands in Allentown and Quakerville. At the 
Allentown newsstand, Las Vegas Sporting News and The 
Sporting News were displayed within inches of each other in 
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a bay window in front of the store, along with a large 
number of other sporting type publications. 
 
John Kastberg, vice-president of Times Mirror's The 
Sporting News, conducted his own investigation in 
December 1998, during which he visited three newsstands 
in New York City: 
 
       I went to a newsstand in Penn Station which is a train 
       terminal in New York, I went to Barnes & Noble in New 
       York and I went to a newsstand in Grand Central 
       Terminal which is another train station in New York. 
       . . . [W]hen I went to Penn Station I asked the guy "Do 
       you have the Las Vegas Sporting News," and he 
       handed me the Times Mirror Sporting News. . . . I went 
       to the Barnes & Noble, asked the same question, got 
       Times Mirror Sporting News and the same thing 
       happened at Grand Central. All three times I was 
       handed the Times Mirror Sporting News when I asked 
       for Las Vegas Sporting News. 
 
App. at 24-25. 
 
Two weeks after Hauze's investigation, Times Mirrorfiled 
a complaint in district court, charging LVSN with infringing 
Times Mirror's registered mark in violation of section 32 of 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1114(1); with false designation 
of origin in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C. S 1125(a); with trademark dilution in violation of 
section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c); and 
with common law unfair competition and infringement. 
 
On December 3, 1998, both parties participated in an 
evidentiary hearing on Times Mirror's motion for a 
preliminary injunction, in which it sought to enjoin LVSN 
from using the phrase "Sporting News" on its publication. 
In its March 4, 1999 Order and Memorandum Opinion, the 
district court concluded that Times Mirror was likely to 
succeed on the merits of its federal trademark dilution 
claim and consequently granted Times Mirror's request for 
a preliminary injunction, thereby enjoining LVSN from 
using the phrase "Sporting News" in connection with its 
weekly publication. The district court granted the 
preliminary injunction solely on trademark dilution by 
blurring grounds and did not consider Times Mirror's other 
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claims. The parties subsequently agreed inter alia that the 
preliminary injunction would be stayed pending appeal to 
this court. 
 
II. 
 
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 provides: 
 
        The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, 
       subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms 
       as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction 
       against another person's commercial use in commerce 
       of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the 
       mark has become famous and causes dilution of the 
       distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such 
       other relief as is provided in this subsection. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1125(c)(1). 
 
The federal cause of action for trademark dilution grants 
extra protection to strong, well-recognized marks even in 
the absence of a likelihood of consumer confusion--the 
classical test for trademark infringement--if the defendant's 
use diminishes or dilutes the strong identification value 
associated with the plaintiff 's famous mark. 4 McCarthy on 
Trademarks and Unfair Competition S 24:70 (4th ed. 1997). 
The dilution doctrine is founded upon the premise that a 
gradual attenuation of the value of a famous trademark, 
resulting from another's unauthorized use, constitutes an 
invasion of the senior user's property rights in its mark and 
gives rise to an independent commercial tort for trademark 
dilution. Id. 
 
To establish a prima facie claim for relief under the 
federal dilution act, the plaintiff must plead and prove: 
 
       1. The plaintiff is the owner of a mark that qualifies 
       as a "famous" mark in light of the totality of the 
       eight factors listed in S 1125(c)(a), 
 
       2. The defendant is making commercial use in 
       interstate commerce of a mark or trade name, 
 
       3. Defendant's use began after the plaintiff 's mark 
       became famous, and 
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       4. Defendant's use causes dilution by lessening the 
       capacity of the plaintiff 's mark to identify and 
       distinguish goods or services. 
 
See 4 McCarthy, supra, S 24:89; see also Hershey Foods 
Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 504 (M.D. Pa. 1998) 
(quoting 4 McCarthy, supra). A court may consider the 
following eight non-exclusive factors in determining the 
famousness vel non of a mark: 
 
        (A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinc tiveness 
       of the mark; 
 
        (B) the duration and extent of use of the mark  in 
       connection with the goods or services with which the 
       mark is used; 
 
        (C) the duration and extent of advertising and 
       publicity of the mark; 
 
        (D) the geographical extent of the trading are a in 
       which the mark is used; 
 
        (E) the channels of trade for the goods and se rvices 
       with which the mark is used; 
 
        (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in t he 
       trading areas and channels of trade used by the 
       marks' owner and the person against whom the 
       injunction is sought; 
 
        (G) the nature and extent of use of the same o r 
       similar marks by third parties; and 
 
        (H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of 
       March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or 
       on the principal register. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H). 
 
The district court held Times Mirror established a 
likelihood of success on the merits of its federal dilution 
claim against LVSN, because (1) Times Mirror's mark"The 
Sporting News" was famous; (2) LVSN made commercial use 
in interstate commerce of the name "Las Vegas Sporting 
News"; (3) Times Mirror's mark became famous before LVSN 
began using the name "Las Vegas Sporting News" and (4) 
LVSN's use of that name diluted the strength of"The 
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Sporting News" mark. Because Appellant only challenges 
the first and last prongs of Times Mirror's prima facie claim 
for dilution, we focus our attention on the district court's 
findings that "The Sporting News" is a famous mark under 
the Act and that LVSN's use diluted the strength of Times 
Mirror's mark. 
 
III. 
 
LVSN argues that the district court erred in granting 
Times Mirror a preliminary injunction because its mark 
"The Sporting News" is not famous and because the court 
did not make a separate finding as to the distinctiveness of 
Times Mirror's trademark. 
 
A. 
 
Appellant contends that "The Sporting News" cannot be 
famous under the Act because it is not famous to the 
general public, and "substantial case law indicates that 
marks famous in a specialized market, rather than well- 
known to the general public, should not be considered 
`famous' under the federal dilution statute." Appellant Br. 
at 23 (citing Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading 
Authorities, Inc., 33 F. Supp.2d 488, 503 (E.D. Va. 1999)). 
However, in the case Appellant cites for its theory, the court 
did not specifically adopt or reject a niche market theory for 
fame. See Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc., 33 F. Supp.2d 
at 503 ("In the instant case, it is ultimately unnecessary to 
resolve this still-unsettled question, since even if fame in a 
niche market were sufficient to establish fame under the 
Act, consideration of the statutory factors reveals that [the 
plaintiff] has failed to make even this demonstration."). 
Thus, this case is not particularly helpful to our analysis. 
 
We recognize that not all courts' decisions have been 
precise in addressing the question whether a mark can be 
famous in a niche market. The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has addressed the niche market debate: 
 
        At an initial glance, there appears to be a wide 
       variation on this issue [of whether a mark famous in a 
       niche market is entitled to protection under the FTDA]. 
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       Some cases apparently hold that fame in a niche 
       market is insufficient for a federal dilution claim, while 
       some hold that such fame is sufficient. However, a 
       closer look indicates that the different lines of authority 
       are addressing two different contexts. Cases holding 
       that niche-market fame is insufficient generally 
       address the context in which the plaintiff and 
       defendant are using the mark in separate markets. On 
       the other hand, cases stating that niche-market 
       renown is a factor indicating fame address a context 
       . . . in which the plaintiff and defendant are using the 
       mark in the same or related markets. 
 
Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp. , 192 F.3d 
633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal footnotes omitted); see 
also Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 222 (2d 
Cir. 1999) ("[D]ilution can occur where the[defendant's] use 
competes directly with the [plaintiff 's] as well as where the 
[defendant] is in a non-competing market. In general, the 
closer the products are to one another [in the marketplace], 
the greater the likelihood of both confusion and dilution."). 
 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition lends 
further support to the theory that niche market fame is 
sufficient to protect a mark from dilution within that 
market: 
 
        A mark that is highly distinctive only to a select class 
       or group of purchasers may be protected from diluting 
       uses directed at that particular class or group. For 
       example, a mark may be highly distinctive among 
       purchasers of a specific type of product. In such 
       circumstances, protection against a dilution of the 
       mark's distinctiveness is ordinarily appropriate only 
       against uses specifically directed at that particular 
       class of purchasers . . . . 
 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition S 25 cmt. e (1995 
Main Vol.); see 4 McCarthy, supra,S 24:112. We are 
persuaded that a mark not famous to the general public is 
nevertheless entitled to protection from dilution where both 
the plaintiff and defendant are operating in the same or 
related markets, so long as the plaintiff 's mark possesses 
a high degree of fame in its niche market. 
 
                                10 
  
The district court determined that Times Mirror and 
LVSN competed in the same, or at least significantly 
related, markets--namely, the sports periodicals market. 
LVSN contends that its readers, who essentially are 
interested in wagering on sports, are distinct from the 
readers of The Sporting News, who are interested in sports 
generally. We find such a distinction to be without merit. 
Surely many, if not the vast majority, of those individuals 
who gamble on sports in Las Vegas also follow the sports 
on which they are wagering. We conclude therefore that the 
district court did not err by finding that LVSN and Times 
Mirror shared a common market. Because a mark can be 
famous in a niche market where the mark has a high 
degree of distinctiveness within the market and where the 
plaintiff and defendant operate within or along side that 
market, we hold that the district court did not commit an 
obvious error by holding that the mark "The Sporting News" 
was famous in its niche and therefore entitled to protection 
under the FTDA against LVSN's use of a similar mark in 
the same market. 
 
B. 
 
LVSN also argues that "The Sporting News" is not famous 
because it is merely a descriptive mark and does not satisfy 
the eight statutory factors for fame listed in 15 U.S.C. 
S 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H). Because Appellant disputes the district 
court's factual findings with regard to fame and its 
application of the S 1125(c)(1) fame factors, we review each 
factor of the district court's analysis and will not reverse 
unless the district court committed an obvious error in 
applying the law or made a serious mistake in considering 
the proof presented. See A.O. Smith, 530 F.2d at 525. 
 
The district court concluded that "The Sporting News" 
mark was famous under S 1125(c)(1) for the following 
reasons: 
 
       First, "The Sporting News" is a federally registered 
       trademark. Because a mark does not qualify for federal 
       trademark registration unless it is distinctive, see 15 
       U.S.C. S 1052, federal registration goes a long way 
       toward proving that the mark has inherent or acquired 
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       distinctiveness. Second, "The Sporting News" has been 
       used on the magazine's banner headline since 1886. 
       Third, The Sporting News is advertised on television, in 
       direct mail solicitations and promotions, and, 
       occasionally, on the radio. In recent years, Times 
       Mirror has spent millions of dollars improving the 
       magazine. Fourth and finally, Times Mirror uses"The 
       Sporting News" trademark throughout the United 
       States and Canada and on the internet. 
 
D. Ct. Op. at 8-9 (internal quotation marks, footnotes and 
citations omitted). We now review the district court's 
analysis of the famousness of the mark "The Sporting 
News" and its application of the eight non-exclusive 
statutory factors for famousness set forth in Part II, supra. 
 
1. 
 
Applying the first factor under 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c)(1), the 
district court determined that "The Sporting News" had a 
high degree of distinctiveness in the sports periodicals 
market. Although the district court did not elaborate on 
this finding, its factual conclusion was not erroneous. 
 
The degree of acquired or inherent distinctiveness of a 
mark bears directly upon the issue of whether that mark is 
famous. See 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c)(1)(A). The mark "The 
Sporting News" is not inherently fanciful or creative, and 
thus the mark does not have a high degree of inherent 
distinctiveness. We must therefore examine the degree to 
which the mark has acquired distinctiveness by gaining 
secondary meaning over time in the marketplace. To 
determine whether a trademark has acquired 
distinctiveness by the attachment of secondary meaning, 
we examine the following considerations: (1) the length or 
exclusivity of use of the mark; (2) the size or prominence of 
the plaintiff 's enterprise; (3) the existence of substantial 
advertising by the plaintiff; (4) established place in the 
market and (5) proof of intentional copying. I.P. Lund 
Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 42 (1st Cir. 1998). The 
district court concluded that "The Sporting News," although 
not a fanciful or arbitrary trademark, has acquired 
secondary meaning, and thus distinctiveness in the sports 
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periodicals market, because it has been used in commerce 
since 1886 and because Times Mirror has expended 
millions of dollars in advertising and promoting their mark 
through various media outlets. Times Mirror presented 
evidence to support several of the considerations for 
acquired distinctiveness set forth in I.P. Lund . We therefore 
conclude that the district court did not err byfinding that 
"The Sporting News" had gained secondary meaning and a 
high degree of distinctiveness in its market. 
 
2. 
 
The district court also found that the second statutory 
factor--extent and duration of use of the mark--weighed in 
favor of finding the mark famous, because The Sporting 
News has been continuously published since 1886. See 
S 1125(c)(1)(B). We find that the district court did not err in 
this respect. 
 
3. 
 
The district court found that the third statutory factor-- 
extent and duration of advertising--weighed in favor of 
finding the mark famous, because Times Mirror presented 
credible proof of extensive advertising and additional 
publicity from the Internet. See S 1125(c)(1)(C). Here, too, 
the district court did not err. 
 
4. 
 
The fourth factor is the geographical extent of the trading 
area in which the mark is used. See S 1125(c)(1)(D). Since 
1886, The Sporting News has grown to a circulation of over 
540,000 in both Canada and the United States, as well as 
a recent internet site. The district court found this evidence 
supported a finding that the mark was famous and we will 
not disturb it. 
 
5. 
 
The fifth and sixth factors for fame are the degrees of 
recognition of the mark in its channels of trade and the 
 
                                13 
  
degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas, see 
S 1125(c)(1)(E)-(F), and the seventh factor is the nature and 
extent of the use of a same or similar mark by third parties, 
see S 1125(c)(1)(G). The district court did not explicitly 
address these factors in its opinion. Nevertheless, the FTDA 
does not require that courts strictly apply every factor in 
the statute. See S 1125(c)(1) (providing that "a court may 
consider factors such as, but not limited to") (emphasis 
added). It was not an abuse of its discretion for the court 
to omit explicit discussion of these factors in its analysis, 
because the majority of the other fame factors weighed in 
favor of finding the mark famous. 
 
6. 
 
Finally, the district court determined that the eighth 
factor--whether the mark was registered--favored Times 
Mirror, because "The Sporting News" was registered in 
1886. See S 1125(c)(1)(H). 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err by 
concluding that "The Sporting News" mark was famous in 
the sports periodicals market. 
 
IV. 
 
As a final argument against the district court'sfinding 
that "The Sporting News" mark was famous, LVSN contends 
that S 1125(c)(1) requires that a mark be subject to a test 
for fame and a separate test for distinctiveness under the 
FTDA. Although some courts agree with Appellant's  
contention,1 we are persuaded that this interpretation is 
inconsistent with the language and construction of the 
statute. 
 
To be sure, S 1125(c)(1) does state that a court may 
consider eight statutory factors, among others,"[i]n 
determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous." 15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 n.2 (2d 
Cir. 1999) ("McCarthy's treatise contends that the statute does not 
include an independent requirement of distinctiveness. . . . We 
disagree.") 
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U.S.C. S 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). We believe, however, 
that "distinctiveness" as used in S 1125(c)(1) is only a 
synonym for "fame." Any other reading of the statutory 
language will result in the statute being redundant because 
the first statutory factor for fame is "the degree of inherent 
or acquired distinctiveness" of the mark. See  S 1125(c)(1)(A); 
see also 4 McCarthy, supra, S 24:91 ("[T]here is . . . no 
separate statutory requirement of `distinctiveness,' apart 
from a finding that the designation be a `mark' that is 
`famous.' `Distinctiveness' is used here only as a synonym 
for `fame.' ").2 If a mark is famous, then it is presumed 
distinctive. See Viacom, Inc. v. Ingram Enterprises, Inc., 141 
F.3d 886, 890 n.6 (8th Cir. 1998). We conclude that there 
is no separate statutory requirement of distinctiveness 
apart from a finding of fame. 
 
V. 
 
LVSN argues also it was obvious error for the district 
court to apply Judge Sweet's test for "dilution by blurring" 
found in Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 
875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring). 
 
Before discussing the mechanics of Judge Sweet's Mead 
Data test for dilution, we first explain how trademark 
dilution can occur. A trademark can be diluted two 
different ways: by blurring or by tarnishment. Only dilution 
by blurring is at issue in this appeal. "Blurring" in this 
context means "to make dim, indistinct or indefinite." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 243 (1968). 
Blurring occurs when the defendant's use of its mark 
causes the public to no longer associate the plaintiff 's 
famous mark with its goods or services; the public instead 
begins associating both the plaintiff and the defendant with 
the famous mark. See I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 47-48; 4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Trademark Review Commission Report, the impetus behind the 
FTDA, stated: "The same type of evidence which is traditionally used to 
prove distinctiveness can be used to prove fame. Although the registrant 
is not required to prove distinctiveness apart from the import of 
registration, any additional evidence of distinctiveness will ordinarily 
be 
entitled to substantial weight." Report of the Trademark Review 
Commission, 77 Trademark Rep. 375, 459-460 (1987). 
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McCarthy, supra, S 24:70. Dilution by blurring takes place 
when the defendant's use of its mark causes the identifying 
features of the plaintiff 's famous mark to become vague 
and less distinctive. To prove dilution by blurring, the 
owner of a famous mark must prove that the capacity of its 
mark to continue to be strong and famous would be 
endangered by the defendant's use of its mark. See 4 
McCarthy, supra, S 29:94. 
 
To determine whether LVSN's use blurred, and therefore 
diluted, Times Mirror's mark for "The Sporting News," the 
district court applied the dilution factors set forth in Judge 
Sweet's concurrence in Mead Data: 
 
       1. similarity of the marks 
 
       2. similarity of the products covered by the marks 
 
       3. sophistication of consumers 
 
       4. predatory intent 
 
       5. renown of the senior mark 
 
       6. renown of the junior mark 
 
Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1035 (Sweet, J., concurring); see 
D. Ct. Op. at 10-11. 
 
Several courts and commentators have criticized Judge 
Sweet's dilution test as the offspring of classical likelihood 
of confusion analysis and not particularly relevant or 
helpful in resolving issues of dilution by blurring. See, e.g., 
4 McCarthy, supra, S 24:94.1; see also, e.g., I.P. Lund, 163 
F.3d at 49-50 (reiterating the criticisms of Judge Sweet's 
dilution by blurring test). Instead of outright rejection of the 
Sweet factors, most courts have improved upon the test's 
shortcomings by supplementing the Sweet test with other 
considerations more pertinent to the issue of dilution. See, 
e.g., Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 227 ("We think it would be a 
serious mistake at the outset of our consideration of the 
new federal antidilution statute to limit ourselves to these 
six factors or to any other putatively definitive list."). In 
Nabisco, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
articulated a more complete set of factors for dilution by 
blurring, including 
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       actual confusion and likelihood of confusion, shared 
       customers and geographic isolation, the adjectival 
       quality of the junior use, and the interrelated factors of 
       duration of the junior use, harm to the junior user, 
       and delay by the senior user in bringing the action. 
 
Id. at 228. Because we consider the dilution analysis in 
Nabisco helpful, we apply it to facts found by the district 
court. 
 
The district court concluded that 
 
       [t]his criticism [of Judge Sweet's dilution test] 
       notwithstanding, blurring sufficient to constitute 
       dilution requires a case-by-case factual inquiry, and in 
       this case, the Court finds that the Sweet factors are 
       useful in evaluating the likelihood that LVSN's use of 
       Las Vegas Sporting News lessens the capacity of The 
       Sporting News to identify and distinguish Times 
       Mirror's goods or services. 
 
D. Ct. Op. at 11-12 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). Applying the Sweet factors, the district court 
concluded that Times Mirror was likely to prevail on its 
dilution claim based on the following facts: 
 
       First, the two marks are similar. Not only do the two 
       marks use dominant identical words, i.e., the words 
       "Sporting News," but they both print those words in 
       red lettering on a single line that spans horizontally 
       across the publication's cover, which generally features 
       a well-known sports figure. Las Vegas Sporting News 
       and The Sporting News use different type styles, and 
       LVSN outlines its mark in black whereas Times Mirror 
       outlines its mark in black and white. The lettering thus 
       is distinguishable, but similar nevertheless. Second, 
       both LVSN and Times Mirror use their mark to cover a 
       weekly publication. Third, the undisputed testimony 
       indicated that consumers do not purchase [these] 
       publications in a sophisticated manner, but tend to 
       select their purchase on "impulse," largely based on 
       the publication cover rather than the content. Fourth, 
       the similarity of the marks and their placement on the 
       publication cover might be coincidental, but the 
       evidence showed that the publisher of Las Vegas 
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       Sporting News was aware of The Sporting News  at the 
       time he changed the name of his periodical. Finally, 
       The Sporting News is well known, whereas Las Vegas 
       Sporting News is not. 
 
D. Ct. Op. at 12-13. We hold that the district court did not 
make an obvious error in applying these facts to Judge 
Sweet's factors. Although the district court applied Judge 
Sweet's test and did not explicitly adopt the Nabisco factors 
or any other supplemental dilution factors, our application 
of the Nabisco dilution factors to the facts supports the 
district court's conclusion that LVSN diluted "The Sporting 
News" mark by blurring its distinctive qualities. 
 
Actual confusion has been shown to exist among those 
selling the two publications, even though no consumer 
surveys were submitted to the district court during the 
preliminary injunction hearing. The evidence presented at 
the hearing supports the finding that a strong likelihood of 
confusion is present, because LVSN's mark and publication 
cover are very similar to Times Mirror's mark and the cover 
of The Sporting News. Sufficient evidence supports a finding 
that customers who purchase these sports publications 
are "unsophisticated consumers," because they often 
buy on impulse and because the publications are 
relatively inexpensive. Unsophisticated buyers lack the 
discrimination and "are more vulnerable to confusion, 
mistake and misassociations against which the trademark 
protects." Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 220. Furthermore, LVSN 
has a short duration of use because its first use of its new 
publication name was in 1997. 
 
Finally, Times Mirror did not unreasonably delay in 
brining an action against LVSN. Times Mirror first 
discovered the publication Las Vegas Sporting News in 
August 1997. One month later, Times Mirror sent LVSN a 
cease and desist letter, thereupon triggering a series of 
correspondence and negotiations between the parties. 
Times Mirror's delay was attributable to its belief that LVSN 
would change the name of its publication. Once 
negotiations failed, Times Mirror filed suit. Thus, Times 
Mirror did not unduly delay filing an action against LVSN. 
 
After weighing the dilution factors from Judge Sweet's 
Mead Data concurrence as supplemented by the Nabisco 
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analysis, we conclude that the district court did not err by 
finding that Times Mirror was likely to prevail on the merits 
of its dilution claim. 
 
VI. 
 
LVSN contends also that the district court erred by 
granting the preliminary injunction, because Times Mirror 
failed to show that it would suffer irreparable harm if the 
injunction was not issued. On this point, the district court 
stated: 
 
        In the trademark context, irreparable harm may be 
       shown even in the absence of actual injury to 
       plaintiff 's business based on plaintiff 's demonstration 
       of a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim. The 
       Court therefore finds that in the absence of an 
       injunction, Times Mirror will suffer irreparable harm. 
 
D. Ct. Op. at 13-14 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 
We have held that a lack of control over the use of one's 
own mark amounts to irreparable harm. See Opticians 
Ass'n v. Independent Opticians, 920 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 
1990) (stating that potential damage to a mark holder's 
reputation or goodwill or likely confusion between parties' 
marks constitute irreparable injury for the purpose of 
granting a preliminary injunction). LVSN argues that the 
15-month delay, beginning when Times Mirror was on 
notice of the new name of LVSN's publication and ending 
when Times Mirror filed suit against LVSN, necessarily 
shows that Times Mirror's injury, if any, is not immediate 
and irreparable. This argument does not persuade us, 
because the 15-month delay was attributable to 
negotiations between the parties. We conclude that the 
district court did not err by determining that Times Mirror 
would be irreparably harmed if the preliminary injunction 
did not issue. 
 
*  *  * 
 
We have also considered Appellant's contentions that the 
district court erred by determining that the benefits from 
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preliminary injunctive relief outweighed the injury such 
relief would cause LVSN and that the public interest would 
be served by granting Times Mirror's motion for a 
preliminary injunction. Neither contention has sufficient 
merit to warrant further discussion. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
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BARRY, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
 
How famous a mark must be before it can be afforded 
protection under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
("FTDA") is a question of first impression in this Circuit, a 
question which implicates the expansion of trademark 
rights under the Lanham Act and one which has received 
much judicial attention elsewhere since the passage of the 
FTDA. The correct answer to this question is of critical 
importance in order that an appropriate balance between 
free competition and property rights be maintained. 1 The 
majority holds that the District Court did not err in finding 
that "The Sporting News" mark was sufficiently famous to 
merit protection under the FTDA. Because I conclude that 
Times Mirror has not shown and, in my view, cannot show 
that it is likely to satisfy the threshold fame requirement, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
I. 
 
Fame means FAME 
 
The FTDA offers little guidance as to what is required to 
find a mark famous. Thus, courts must rely on legislative 
history and, where helpful, look to dilution theory which 
has developed over years of judicial interpretation of state 
anti-dilution statutes. Dilution theory in the United States 
emanated from a 1927 Harvard Law Review article which 
posited that protection against dilution would fill the gap in 
trademark law left by infringement theory which only 
provided protection when a junior user applied a 
deceptively similar mark to similar goods to confuse a 
competitor's consumers about the source of the goods. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Commentators have warned that expansion of a dilution cause of 
action could harm competition. See, e.g. , Mark A. Lemley, The Modern 
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L. J. 1687 (May 
1999); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L. J. 367 
(Spring 1999); William Marroletti, Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The 
Need for a Clear International Standard to Determine Trademark Dilution, 
25 Brook. J. Int'l L. 659 (1999); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: 
The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 789 (Summer 1997). 
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Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 825 (1927). In the absence 
of a dilution cause of action, trademark law was unable to 
protect mark owners from the unauthorized use of a 
deceptively similar mark placed upon dissimilar or non- 
competing goods. Before passage of the FTDA, state anti- 
dilution statutes attempted to fill this gap in trademark 
law. However, because truly famous marks -- and"truly" 
will become the operative word here -- are ordinarily used 
on a nationwide basis but only half of the states provided 
remedies for dilution, Congress recognized the need for a 
federal anti-dilution statute. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 
4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029. Accordingly, 
the FTDA was passed to fill the gap and "to bring 
uniformity and consistency to the protection of famous 
marks." See id. at 3. 
 
Historically, the Lanham Act has attempted to balance 
the two competing goals of protecting consumers and 
protecting a trademark owner's investment. The FTDA, 
however, is concerned only with the latter: 
 
       It does not have those twin public policy goals of the 
       laws of trademark infringement[.] As a result there may 
       be a kind of judicial restraint about the new law. The 
       perception may be that it does not carry any 
       compelling need to protect the public, and that it 
       benefits only a coterie of American business elite, not 
       the general public. 
 
Jerome Gilson, 2 Trademark Protection & Practice  (1999) 
S 5.12[1][e] at 5-272 to 5-273 (hereinafter "Gilson"). 
Moreover, there can be little doubt that Congress sought to 
protect only a select and narrow class of truly famous and 
well-recognized marks. "Without such a requirement, an 
anti-dilution statute becomes a rogue law that turns every 
trademark, no matter how weak, into an anti-competitive 
weapon." 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks 
and Unfair Competition, (4th ed. 1999) S 24:108 at 24-210 
(hereinafter "McCarthy"). "To save the dilution doctrine from 
abuse by plaintiffs whose marks are not famous and 
distinctive, a large neon sign should be placed adjacent 
wherever the doctrine resides, reading: `The Dilution Rule: 
Only Strong Marks Need Apply.' " 4 McCarthy S 24:108 at 
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24-209; see also 2 Gilson S 5.12[1][b] at 5-260 (referring to 
class of trademarks protected by FTDA as "Supermarks"). 
 
The legislative history of the Act is crystal clear that 
Congress intended courts to be highly selective in 
determining which marks are famous and accorded those 
truly famous marks an unprecedented degree of protection. 
A 1987 Report of the Trademark Review Commission of the 
United States Trademark Association (USTA) emphasized 
how limited this universe should be: "We believe that a 
limited category of trademarks, those which are truly 
famous and registered, are deserving of national protection 
from dilution[.] We therefore urge the adoption of a highly 
selective federal dilution statute[.]" Trademark Review 
Commission, Report & Recommendations, 77 Trademark 
Rep. 375, 455 (1987).2 The Report of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on the precursor to the FTDA stated that the 
1988 bill 
 
       creates a highly selective federal cause of action to 
       protect federally registered marks that are truly famous 
       from dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. The 
       provision is specifically intended to address a narrow 
       category of famous registered trademarks where the 
       unauthorized use by others, on dissimilar products for 
       which the trademark is not registered, dilutes the 
       distinctiveness of the famous work[.] 
 
       Section 43(c) of the Act is to be applied selectively and 
       is intended to provide protection only to those marks 
       which are both truly distinctive and famous, and 
       therefore most likely to be adversely affected by 
       dilution. To protect these special marks, and to ensure 
       that the bill does not supplant the current protection of 
       trademarks based on the likelihood of confusion, the 
       committee amended the legislation to place greater 
       emphasis on the factors the courts must weigh in 
       determining whether a mark possesses a sufficient 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In 1988, legislation based on the Commission's proposal for a dilution 
statute limited only to "famous marks" was approved by the Senate, but 
did not survive in the House of Representatives. Subsequently, the 
Commission's proposal became, in large part, the basis for the FTDA. 
See 4 McCarthy S 24:87. 
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       level of fame and distinctive quality to qualify for 
       federal protection from dilution. 
 
S. Rep. No. 100-515 (reproduced in 6 McCarthy  App. A5, at 
41-42)(emphasis added). Examples of truly famous marks 
cited in a House Report on the FTDA included "Buick", 
"Dupont", and "Kodak". See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 4 
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031. In a 
nutshell, the legislative history amply supports the 
conclusion that the FTDA should be restricted to a narrow 
category of marks, ensuring that it does not swallow 
infringement law by allowing mark owners to end-run a 
likelihood of confusion analysis which they fear-- or, 
indeed, know -- they cannot win. 
 
Despite Congressional intent that the FTDA protect only 
a narrow category of truly famous marks, some early 
judicial interpretations of the Act granted dilution 
protection after engaging in only a cursory analysis (or no 
analysis at all) of the fame of the mark. See , e.g., Gazette 
Newspapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 688, 
696-97 (D. Md. 1996)(no separate analysis of fame); 
Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd. , No. 96- 
130, 1996 WL 84853 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996)(entering 
preliminary injunction on dilution claim without discussing 
fame). Little if any analysis, of course, would be required to 
find marks such as "Buick", "Dupont" or "Kodak" truly 
famous or, in the context of sports with which we deal here, 
that the mark "New York Yankees" is so famous that even 
non-sports fans are well aware of it. If, however, marks 
which are not such household names can be protected by 
the Act -- and, in my view, that is a big "if " -- those marks 
must be subjected to a rigorous analysis. As one 
commentator has noted with some alarm: 
 
       [C]ourts thus far have shown little inclination to limit 
       protection to the truly famous marks envisioned by the 
       drafters of the [FTDA]. Instead, the courts, when they 
       acknowledge the fame requirement at all, simply state 
       a mark's fame in conclusory terms without attention to 
       the eight fame factors. Unless courts strictly adhere to 
       the admittedly vague dictates of the federal dilution 
       statute, federal dilution protection will surely give rise 
       to a broad regime of trademark rights in gross. 
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Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away 
of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Pitt. L. 
Rev. 789, 68 (Summer 1997). 
 
This concern has not gone unnoticed, and courts are now 
taking pains to emphasize the rigor of the fame 
requirement. For example, the Ninth Circuit recently set 
itself apart from the expansive interpretations of the FTDA 
by other courts by vacating a permanent injunction after 
finding that plaintiff 's trademarks were not sufficiently 
famous for FTDA protection and remanding with 
instructions to enter summary judgment for defendant. See 
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 
1999). There, Avery Dennison, the seller of office supplies 
and industrial fasteners, sued an Internet e-mail business 
which offered "vanity" e-mail addresses, alleging that 
defendant's maintenance of the domain name registrations 
 and <dennison.net> diluted Avery Dennison's 
trademarks. The "Avery" mark had been in continuous use 
since the 1930s and had been registered since 1963. The 
"Dennison" mark had been in continuous use since the late 
1800s and registered since 1908. See Avery Dennison, 189 
F.3d at 873. Avery Dennison's annual advertising 
expenditures exceeded $5 million, and its annual sales 
reached $3 billion (although no evidence indicated what 
percentage of these dollar figures applied exclusively to the 
"Avery" or "Dennison" trademarks as opposed to the 
company's other marks). See id. Avery Dennison also 
maintained its own website. 
 
After reviewing dilution theory and the legislative intent 
behind the FTDA, the Court emphasized the role of the 
fame requirement in "reinstating the balance" in the 
Lanham Act to avoid "over-protecting trademarks, at the 
expense of potential non-infringing uses." Id . at 875. 
Despite the fact that the registered marks had acquired 
distinctiveness and that four of the eight statutory fame 
factors favored a finding that the marks were famous, the 
Ninth Circuit held that, as a matter of law, Avery Dennison 
had failed to meet its burden of proving fame for two 
reasons. Id. at 876-77. First, while recognizing that fame in 
a "specialized market segment" might be adequate if the 
"diluting uses are directed narrowly at the same market 
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segment," the Court noted that Avery Dennison provided no 
evidence of customer overlap or that defendant's customers 
possessed any degree of recognition of plaintiff 's marks. Id. 
at 877-78. Second, widespread third-party use of the 
names "Avery" and "Dennison" undermined the famousness 
of the marks. Id. at 878. Thus, the Court held that the 
marks were not entitled to protection under the FTDA. See 
also I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 
& 49 (1st Cir. 1998)(finding mark not famous and noting 
"mark [must] be truly prominent and renowned"; "courts 
should be discriminating and selective in categorizing a 
mark as famous"); G. Kip Edwards, Developments in 
Dilution Law, 579 PLI/Pat 209, 217 (Nov.-Dec. 1999)(noting 
that many early judicial interpretations of the FTDA 
neglected to heed Congressional intent that the Act be 
applied sparingly to truly famous marks and mistakenly 
granted protection to marks that were "famous" only within 
a specialized market niche (citing Gazette Newspapers), but 
noting that the "pendulum may be swinging back toward 
protection only of truly famous marks" (citing Avery 
Dennison)). 
 
If one heeds the legislative history, it is simply beyond 
the pale to find "The Sporting News" mark to be another 
"Buick", "Dupont", or "Kodak", names which have long been 
associated in the public's eye with a particular company or 
a particular product and which immediately strike one as 
being truly famous. Stated somewhat differently, tofind 
that "The Sporting News" mark meets the fame 
requirement, thus entitling it to the extraordinary 
protection the FTDA provides -- a nationwide injunction -- 
would defeat Congress's deliberate design. 
 
II. 
 
Insufficient evidence of fame 
 
The majority, after paying lip service to the fame 
requirement, holds that the District Court did not err by 
concluding that "The Sporting News" mark is famous in the 
sports periodicals market, a "niche market". I disagree. For 
starters, the legislative history does not mention much less 
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embrace a so-called "niche market" theory of fame.3 Beyond 
that, the niche market theory risks lowering the bar for 
trademark protection unless it is applied prudently to cases 
which clearly call for such an analysis, and this is not one. 
For one thing, The Sporting News is directed at the general 
public via subscriptions and at newsstands, thereby 
begging the question: is not the general public the 
appropriate universe for assessing the fame of the mark? 
But even if fame exclusively within the sports periodicals 
market would be enough to establish fame under the FTDA, 
the paltry evidence here does not permit any suchfinding. 
Moreover, I take issue with the rather cursory discussion 
by the majority, and by the District Court, of the eight 
statutory factors for fame. 
 
The fundamental problem with the majority's application 
of the niche market theory, sometimes known as the"big 
fish in a small pond theory," to the facts of this case is that 
it is hard to conceive of any consumer goods or services 
that are not in a narrow market of some type, be it luxury 
cars, cameras, or sporting publications. 
 
       Courts approving the "big fish in a small pond" theory 
       of trademark dilution fail to recognize that it threatens 
       to overrun trademark infringement law. Trademark 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The only reference in the legislative history that even comes close to 
suggesting a so-called "niche-market" theory is found in a discussion of 
the degree of a mark's recognition, where the Trademark Review 
Commission noted that dilution might occur with respect to one universe 
of consumers, but not necessarily to another. "For example, if a mark is 
famous at the industrial level but not at the consumer level, protection 
may be appropriate at the industrial level but not at the consumer level." 
77 Trademark Rep. at 461. This reasoning may provide the basis for the 
application of a niche market theory within a specialized industrial 
niche. See, e.g., Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 
633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999)(finding niche market fame sufficient under 
circumstances in which both parties operated within the narrow 
wholesale market for plastic baskets used for funeral floral bouquets); 
Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 877-78 (involving markets for office 
products, industrial fasteners and e-mail addresses); Teletech Customer 
Care Management (California), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., Inc., 977 F. Supp. 
1407 (C.D. Cal. 1997)(involving "teleservicing industry" where both 
parties provided services for large corporate clients). 
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       infringement law permits similar, or even identical, 
       marks to coexist on non-competing goods. If even a 
       locally famous mark can preclude all other marks in 
       every channel of trade, then conceivably every 
       trademark can be used to create a monopoly in a word 
       or symbol -- a proposition clearly contrary to the intent 
       and practice of trademark law. It is possible tofind 
       virtually any mark to be "famous" within some market, 
       depending on how narrowly that market is defined. 
 
Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark 
Dilution, 17 Franchise L. J. 111, 133 (Spring 1998). 
 
If marks can be "famous" within some market, depending 
on how narrowly that market is defined, then the FTDA will 
surely devour infringement law. Indeed, the unauthorized 
use of a mark in the same or a similar market is precisely 
what good old-fashioned infringement principles have 
traditionally been there to remedy once actual confusion or 
likelihood of confusion has been shown, and there is simply 
no need for dilution principles. Can one imagine a clearer 
case for application of those principles than if one were to 
begin manufacturing automobiles and calling those 
automobiles "Buick"? Similarly, if the parties here operate 
within the sports periodicals market, then this case, at 
least in my view, is a garden variety infringement case, and 
the complaint alleges just that. 
 
Congress was quite clear, however, that the FTDA was 
not designed for situations in which ordinary infringement 
law provided a remedy but, rather, for those situations in 
which a truly famous mark on dissimilar products  deserves, 
but cannot receive, protection under infringement law -- 
those situations in which, for example, no one would ever 
confuse that truly famous mark with the goods or services 
to which it has been wrongly attached. Congress was 
explicit as to where protection was warranted: "DUPONT 
shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos." H.R. Rep. No. 
104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1030. The extensive relief the FTDA authorizes, which gives 
the owner of the famous mark a virtual monopoly by 
precluding all others from using the mark "regardless of the 
presence or absence of . . . competition between the owner 
of the famous mark and other parties, or likelihood of 
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confusion," is itself something federal trademark law had 
not before seen, and surely was not meant to be accorded 
to any marginally "famous" mark. 15 U.S.C.S 1127. It 
follows inexorably that if a mark is famous in the general 
public, it is also famous in its niche market and, in such a 
case, dilution and infringement theories need not be 
mutually exclusive. Before, however, a Court categorically 
adopts the theory that a mark that is not generally 
renowned, but famous only in its niche market, is entitled 
to protection under the FTDA, the evidence of fame should 
be rigorously examined. Had such an examination been 
performed here, only one conclusion could have been 
reached: the evidence of fame is woefully lacking. 
 
A. Factor (F) 
 
The FTDA lists eight non-exclusive statutory factors for 
fame which a court may but is not required to consider. 
The "may" is important because it would make little sense 
to require that a mark which immediately strikes one as 
truly famous -- again, "Buick", "Dupont", or "Kodak" -- be 
analyzed for fame in accordance with these factors, 
although certainly such an analysis would confirm the 
immediate impression of fame. The less truly famous a 
mark is, however, the more rigorous the analysis of the 
statutory factors must be in light of the evidence of record. 
 
It is Factor (F), "the degree of recognition of the mark in 
the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks' 
owner and the person against whom the injunction is 
sought," which gives the FTDA's fame requirement its 
"teeth." As the majority notes, however, the District Court 
did not explicitly address this factor -- and neither did the 
majority. 
 
The guidance which Factor (F) affords to courts is 
somewhat murky. The Act, for example, does not define 
"channels of trade," although presumably that phrase 
means the chain of distribution of the goods featuring the 
mark in question, i.e. the route by which the goods travel 
to the ultimate consumer -- here, from the publisher to the 
reader. Importantly, although Factor (F) focuses the 
analysis on the channels of trade in which the parties 
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operate, it does not dictate the conclusion that fame solely 
within those channels of trade is enough for protection 
under the FTDA. 
 
According to the legislative history, a finding of fame 
"requires substantial renown or fame within both the 
trading area of the mark and the trading area of the other 
party to the dilution suit." S. Rep. No. 100-515 (reproduced 
in 6 McCarthy App. A5, at 43)(emphasis added); see also 77 
Trademark Rep. at 461 (advocating that a mark"should be 
well known to a substantial portion of the relevant 
purchasers of the goods or services.")(emphasis added). 
This, I note, is a higher standard than the"appreciable 
number of persons" standard applied in an infringement 
action in which a plaintiff may prevail only if it shows that 
an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers of 
the type of product in question are likely to become 
confused as to the source of the goods by the defendant's 
use of the mark. See 77 Trademark Rep . at 461; 4 
McCarthy S 24:92 at 24-163. 
 
The crux of any discussion of Factor (F) is whether Times 
Mirror is likely to prove that its mark is recognized by a 
substantial portion of LVSN's potential consumers. Again, 
the FTDA does not quantify the requisite "degree of 
recognition". Consequently, some commentators have called 
for a clear percentage cut-off for consumer recognition. 
McCarthy, for example, recommends that a plaintiff 's mark 
must be known by more than 50% of the defendant's 
potential customers in order to be considered "famous". See 
4 McCarthy S 24:92 at 24-164; see also Xuan-Thao N. 
Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuring and Proving Fame 
and Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63 
Albany L. Rev. 201, 233 (1999)(advocating a 40% rate of 
recognition among defendant's potential customers in a 
nationwide survey). While I am not wed to any specific 
minimum percentage for consumer recognition, I do take 
issue with the fact that Times Mirror has been granted a 
preliminary injunction without offering any evidence 
whatsoever of consumer recognition in LVSN's channel of 
trade.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The majority averts its gaze from what little evidence does exist 
relating to either party's channel of trade. The majority of LVSN copies 
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In the absence of evidence indicating that consumers in 
LVSN's channel of trade recognize Times Mirror's mark, it 
was wrong, in my view, for the District Court and the 
majority to conclude that the publications share a common 
market and that the mark is famous within that market. 
The Sporting News, moreover, is available at newsstands to 
members of the general public, just as Buick automobiles 
and Kodak film are available to the general public. 
Accordingly, to be entitled to a preliminary injunction, it 
was incumbent upon Times Mirror to demonstrate that it is 
likely to succeed in proving that its mark is truly famous 
among members of the general public and, although this 
should follow almost automatically, that its mark is 
recognized by a substantial portion of LVSN's consumers -- 
those who like to gamble, who read gambling publications, 
or who frequent casinos. Such a showing is typically 
achieved through a properly-conducted recognition survey.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(approximately 22,000 out of 42,000 in circulation) are made available at 
no charge in Nevada. Many others are available at no charge at casinos 
in Mississippi, Louisiana, Atlantic City, New Jersey and Foxwood, 
Connecticut. Only a small percentage of copies is sold at newsstands. Of 
the approximately 10,000 to 11,000 copies sent to a couple of hundred 
newsstands in a handful of states, only approximately 1,500 are actually 
sold; the rest are returned to the publisher. By contrast, The Sporting 
News is available nationwide through subscriptions and at newsstands. 
 
In addition, the record does not evidence much if any overlap in 
advertising revenues or readership. Because LVSN is given away at 
casinos, it survives primarily on its advertising revenues. LVSN's 
advertisers tend to be "casinos, paging companies, [and] handicappers." 
Times Mirror, 1999 WL 124416, *2. The Sporting News, on the other 
hand, advertises, inter alia, sports memorabilia, collectibles, 
commemorative collections, apparel, sporting equipment, tobacco 
products and automobiles. LVSN's competitors for advertising dollars 
and readership are not sports magazines, but gambling publications, 
such as Gaming Today, Atlantic City Magazine and Casino Player. The 
Sporting News reports on the six major spectator sports; LVSN reports 
not only on sports gambling, but also on gambling on horse racing, car 
racing, roulette, craps, blackjack, slots -- and presidential elections. 
 
5. See, e.g., Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Ltd., 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1033 
& 1035 (D. Haw. 1996)(secondary meaning survey found 75% of 
respondents associated mark "Star" with plaintiff 's grocery stores; 
recognition survey found that over 96% of respondents recalled 
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Certainly, Times Mirror had ample time and notice (sixteen 
months passed between its discovery of LVSN's title and the 
preliminary injunction hearing) to conduct a recognition 
survey of its mark and/or a survey to determine whether its 
mark would be affected by the presence of LVSN's title in 
the marketplace.6 
 
Assuming, arguendo, that a showing of fame only within 
the sports publication market suffices for protection under 
the FTDA, Congress's intent to reserve dilution protection 
for a select and narrow category of truly famous marks 
cannot be glossed over, as the majority has done, by an 
unsupported finding that "The Sporting News" mark is 
famous within its niche and recognized by a significant 
portion of Las Vegas Sporting News readers."A preliminary 
injunction may not be based on facts not presented at a 
hearing, or not presented through affidavits, deposition 
testimony, or other documents, about the particular 
situation [ ] of the moving part[y]." Adams v. Freedom Forge 
Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 487 (3d Cir. 2000). Times Mirror has 
simply not come forward with any evidence of "the degree 
of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and 
channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person 
against whom the injunction is sought." 15 U.S.C. 
S 1125(c)(1)(F). This failure weighs formidably against any 
conclusion that Times Mirror is likely to succeed on its 
dilution claim. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
plaintiff 's mark when asked to name any grocery store); Ringling Bros.- 
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. Of Travel 
Development, 955 F. Supp. 605, 612 n.4 (E.D. Va. 1997)(40% of 
respondents to recognition survey associated phrase"Greatest Show on 
Earth" with plaintiff 's circus), aff 'd, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), 
cert. 
denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999); Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. 
Supp. 500, 517 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (94% of respondents recognized orange, 
brown and yellow packaging of non-labeled peanut butter candy as 
Reese's brand). 
 
6. Between 1997 and 1998, The Sporting News  spent $500,000 to study 
the market's perception of its title. See"In Brief: The More, The 
Merrier," 
Media Daily, Mar. 2, 1998. The results of this study were not, however, 
introduced into evidence. 
 
                                32 
  
B. The remaining factors 
 
Examination of the remaining statutory factors 
underscores the inadequacy of the evidence offered by 
Times Mirror. Factor (A), the degree of inherent or acquired 
distinctiveness of the mark, encompasses more than simply 
whether "The Sporting News" mark has inherent 
distinctiveness or has acquired distinctiveness through 
secondary meaning, as it must to be eligible for protection 
under the Lanham Act. This factor suggests that the degree 
of the mark's distinctiveness is relevant to the fame inquiry. 
As discussed below with regard to Factor (G), the degree of 
a mark's distinctiveness is weakened by third party use of 
the mark and by the descriptive nature of the mark. 
Therefore, while this factor favors Times Mirror, it does so 
only slightly. 
 
Factor (B), the duration and extent of the use of the 
mark, means more than simply the length of time"The 
Sporting News" mark has been in use, but also the breadth 
of its distribution. Times Mirror did not introduce evidence 
of The Sporting News's sales figures either in toto or broken 
down by source, i.e. newsstand, subscription, advertising, 
or Internet, relying only on its weekly circulation of half a 
million copies in Canada and the United States. It cannot 
be seriously argued that this weekly circulation is not small 
relative to other major publications, including sports 
magazines, and not small period given the population of 
those countries.7 Thus, despite over one hundred years of 
publication of an inexpensive product distributed in 
countries in which there is a huge interest in, and 
concomitant market for, anything to do with sports, the 
relatively limited extent of The Sporting News 's circulation 
certainly does not compel the conclusion that the mark has 
generated a mental association among consumers sufficient 
to support a finding of fame. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See Bill Wallace, "Web Hits Becomes Baseball's New Statistic, Knight- 
Ridder Tribune Business News, Feb. 22, 2000, available at 2000 WL 
14920170 (comparing distribution rates of sports publications -- 3.2 
million weekly distribution of Sports Illustrated, for example -- and 
noting "second-tier" Sporting News's half million "static circulation" 
rate.) 
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Factor (C) addresses how widely and frequently a mark 
has been advertised or publicized which, in turn, suggests 
the public's familiarity with the mark. See 4 McCarthy 
S 24:92. Times Mirror presented evidence that it advertises 
primarily by direct mail, but also on television and 
"occasionally" on the radio in "selected markets". It did not, 
however, provide evidence of its annual advertising 
expenses, nor did it detail where, when, or how the mark 
has been advertised. Moreover, the unadorned fact that 
Times Mirror has an Internet website, a fact the majority 
noted, is of little significance because there is no evidence 
regarding the extent of sales or advertising on the Internet, 
nor is there any evidence regarding, for example, the 
number of "hits" received from visitors to the website which 
would assist in determining the degree of consumer 
recognition of the mark.8 
 
The FTDA, I note, does not specify quantitative 
measurements for Factors (B) and (C), such as a basic 
minimum for sales or advertising. When, however, the 
evidence supporting these factors in this case is compared 
to that in dilution cases in which the mark has been 
deemed "famous", Times Mirror's evidence of sales revenue 
and advertising expenditures falls short.9  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The District Court's fame analysis appears to have added an 
additional factor to the eight statutory factors in emphasizing that 
"Times Mirror has spent millions of dollars improving the magazine." 
Times Mirror, 1999 WL 124416, *5. Large expenditures aimed at 
retooling a product do not contribute to establishing fame unless it can 
be shown that those efforts were effective among the relevant group of 
consumers. While it is possible that a company's investment in its 
product may result in the heightened fame of its mark, it is far from 
clear whether that has occurred here. 
 
9. See, for example: Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., ___ F. 
Supp. 
2d ___, No. 99-1600, 2000 WL 223585, *2, 16 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 20, 
2000)(finding "Prozac" famous; $12 billion in sales over twelve year 
period and "massive" unsolicited publicity rendering mark part of the 
"popular lexicon"); Planet Hollywood (Region IV), Inc. v. Hollywood Casino 
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 815, 840 (N.D. Ill. 1999)(finding "Planet 
Hollywood" mark famous and noting annual sales of more than $195 
million in merchandise bearing mark); NBA Properties v. Untertainment 
Records, L.L.C., No. 99-2933, 1999 WL 335147, *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 
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Factor (G) clearly favors LVSN. Factor (G) takes into 
account the possibility that third party use of the mark or 
elements of the mark has already diluted the mark's 
strength, thereby rendering the mark less famous. See 77 
Trademark Rep. at 461 ("Third party uses of the same or 
similar marks are relevant in determining the fame and 
distinctiveness of the mark, since the mark must be in 
substantially exclusive use. If a mark is in widespread use, 
it may not be famous for the goods or services of one 
business.").10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1999)(finding NBA logo famous; logo appeared on $1.6 billion of 
merchandise over three year period and mark was widely promoted); 
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding 
Pepperidge Farm Goldfish crackers famous; $120 million three year 
marketing campaign and $200 million annual net sales); Ringling Bros., 
955 F. Supp. at 609 (finding slogan "Greatest Show on Earth" famous; 
over $103 million in annual sales derived from goods bearing slogan and 
over $19 million in annual advertising expenditures); American Exp. Co. 
v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 312 (E.D. Mich. 1996)(finding slogan 
"Don't Leave Home Without It" famous; over $600 million in marketing 
expenditures over six years). 
10. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 
1999); Carnival Corp. v. SeaEscape Casino Cruises, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 
1261, 1271 (S.D. Fla. 1999)("the word `fun' is used by many other 
businesses in the travel, gaming, and entertainment industries . . . 
cut[ting] against Carnival's dilution claim"); Michael Caruso & Co., Inc. 
v. 
Estefan Enterprises, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 
1998)(extensive third party use of word "bongo" undermines inherent 
distinctiveness of mark), aff 'd without opinion, 166 F.3d 353 (11th Cir. 
1998); Hershey, 998 F. Supp. at 517 (finding trade dress not sufficiently 
famous and noting several examples of third party's trade dress in food 
industry similar to plaintiff 's color combination and lettering); Sports 
Authority v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 925, 941 (E.D. Mich. 
1997)(third-party use of "authority," whether or not in the relevant 
market, diminishes any distinctive or famous aspects of mark rendering 
it "not so famous as to deserve protection" under the FTDA); Trustees of 
Columbia University v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. , 964 F. Supp. 
733, 744 & 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)(fame of mark "Columbia" for healthcare 
services "has been seriously undermined by third party use of the same 
or similar marks" both within the health care industry and in other 
industries); Star Markets, 950 F. Supp. at 1035 (noting multiple third 
party uses of "Star" and "Star Markets" in food industry and unrelated 
industries); Golden Bear Int'l, Inc. v. Bear U.S.A., Inc., 969 F. Supp. 
742, 
749 (N.D. Ga. 1996)(third parties extensively used both the word "bear" 
and a bear design in connection with the sale of sporting goods and 
clothes). 
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The words "sporting" and "news" are commonplace words 
in our vocabulary appearing on many items, not only 
publications. The majority does not acknowledge that at 
least six other publications use the word "sporting" in their 
titles: Grays Sporting Journal, Southern Sporting Journal, 
Sporting Thoughts, The Sporting Scene, The Sporting Life 
and Sporting Green. LVSN's use of the word"sporting" in its 
title describes the magazine's content. "Sporting" is defined, 
in this record, as "involving betting or gambling as sporting 
men. Involving or inducing the taking of risk as a sporting 
proposition." In Viacom, Inc. v. Ingram Enters., 141 F.3d 
886 (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth Circuit held that while the 
trademark "Blockbuster" for a chain of video stores was 
strong for purposes of an infringement analysis, the mark's 
strength was not necessarily sufficient to sustain a claim 
for dilution-by-blurring due to the ordinariness of the word 
"Blockbuster". See 141 F.3d at 891-92. The court noted 
that "the fact that Viacom is seeking a complete monopoly 
on the use of a rather common word with multiple 
meanings would make us hesitate to uphold summary 
judgment on its dilution-by-blurring claim." Id. (citing 3 
McCarthy S 24:114 at 24-208) (dilution"is a potent legal 
tool, which must be carefully used as a scalpel, not a 
sledgehammer."). Third party use of the commonplace 
elements of Times Mirror's mark weakens its fame. Factor 
(G), therefore, strongly favors LVSN. 
 
The legislative history indicates that the eight factors 
should be weighed independently "and it is the cumulative 
effect of these considerations which will determine whether 
a mark qualifies for federal protection from dilution." S. 
Rep. 100-515 (reproduced in 6 McCarthy App. A5, at 42). 
Moreover, the factors should be interpreted flexibly "so that 
their relative weight in any given case can be balanced." 
Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 504 
(M.D. Pa. 1998). In Hershey, for example, the District Court 
found that even though six of the eight enumerated 
statutory factors favored Hershey (inherent distinctiveness, 
degree of consumer recognition, duration and extent of use, 
advertising and publicity, geographical extent of trading 
area and widespread distribution channels), Hershey's 
trade dress was unlikely to meet the statute's stringent 
fame requirement because of third party use of the same 
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aspects of the trade dress and because it was not 
registered. Here, Factors (B), (D) and (H) favor Times Mirror 
because "The Sporting News" is a registered mark used 
continuously for over 100 years nationwide. However, there 
is little evidence going to Factor (B)'s extent of sales. Times 
Mirror has offered little or no evidence going to factors (C), 
(E) and (F). Factor (G) weighs strongly against Times Mirror. 
Finally, because third party use and the descriptive nature 
of the mark tend to weaken its distinctiveness, Factor (A) 
only slightly favors Times Mirror. 
 
In my view, the District Court failed to sufficiently 
evaluate the mark -- it did not consider several of the 
statutory factors, nor did it qualitatively weigh those factors 
it did consider. Even if a mark not immediately recognizable 
by the general public can, nonetheless, meet the fame 
requirement of the FTDA, and I do not believe it can, at this 
preliminary stage, based upon the inadequate record before 
us, I cannot agree that Times Mirror is likely to succeed in 
proving the fame of its mark.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. My disagreement with the majority rests primarily on my conclusion 
that Times Mirror has not come close to satisfying the threshold 
requirement of fame to qualify for protection under the FTDA. It goes 
without saying, therefore, that I would also disagree that Times Mirror 
was likely to prevail on its dilution claim. One observation: the majority 
holds that the District Court did not err in applying what have become 
known as the "Sweet factors" to determine whether LVSN's use blurred 
and, therefore, diluted, Times Mirror's mark for"The Sporting News". In 
addition to the Sweet factors, which have been roundly criticized, the 
majority appears to have adopted the multiple factor test articulated in 
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999), which 
includes the factor of likelihood of confusion, a factor which is required 
in a standard infringement analysis, but not in a dilution analysis. While 
I have no difficulty with adopting an appropriate list of factors for 
consideration, I note that we are the only Circuit to have considered the 
applicability of the Sweet factors -- and the Nabisco factors -- which has 
not articulated a specific critique or rejected some or all of the 
factors. 
We should do so as well. 
 
The majority also holds that the District Court did not err in finding 
that irreparable injury may be shown even in the absence of actual 
economic harm, presumably siding with the Second Circuit and rejecting 
the Fourth Circuit's position on the issue. Compare Ringling Bros.- 
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III. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The FTDA grants broad discretion to the federal courts 
and, as one commentator has remarked, "it is up to the 
judiciary to apply such potent laws with care and common 
sense lest they damage the competitive systems they are 
designed to enhance." 4 McCarthy S 24:114 at 24-222. Lax 
interpretation of FTDA requirements forecasts easier 
lawsuits for trademark owners who will use a dilution 
cause of action as a "tack-on" to an infringement claim in 
the event that likelihood of confusion cannot be shown, and 
even when, as perhaps here, it can. See Klieger, Trademark 
Dilution, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 64 ("It may just be a matter 
of time before dilution eclipses confusion as the gravamen 
of most federal trademark actions and trademark rights in 
gross displace consumer protection as the defining feature 
of United States Trademark law."); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. 
Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 48 (1st Cir. 1998)("Dilution laws 
are intended to address specific harms; they are not 
intended to serve as mere fallback protection for trademark 
owners unable to prove trademark infringement."). 
 
Naturally, when a court rules on a motion for a 
preliminary injunction, it makes an initial judgment based 
on an incomplete factual record; its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are subject to revision based on 
additional discovery. The stakes are, nonetheless, high; 
here, for example, had the injunction not been stayed with 
the consent of the parties, lowering the bar for the fame 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. Of Travel 
Development, 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 
286 (1999), with Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-24. I agree, and note only that 
it would be well-nigh impossible for a widely sold product such as Kodak 
to show that its sales have been impacted by a diluting use of its mark. 
Indeed, Kodak's sales might well be increasing even as the 
distinctiveness of its truly famous mark is being whittled away by an 
unauthorized user. See S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 108 (noting that 
distinctive quality of a mark "could be materially reduced during a period 
of rising sales"). 
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requirement would have forced LVSN to alter its publication 
at great cost or cease publishing altogether.12 
 
Yet again, we have recently stressed our respect for the 
extraordinary nature of the preliminary injunction power 
and the fact that "the use of judicial power to arrange 
relationships prior to a full determination on the merits is 
a weighty matter" to be reserved for extraordinary 
situations. Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 
487 (3d Cir. 2000). This is surely not such a situation. I 
would vacate the preliminary injunction. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. A District Court's review of the merits of a dilution claim at the 
preliminary injunction stage may also be significant because, as at least 
one court has held, the cause of action is essentially equitable in nature 
and may not provide a right to a jury trial. See Ringling Bros., 955 F. 
Supp. 598, 605 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff 'd on other grounds, 170 F.3d 449 
(4th Cir. 1999)(reserving constitutional issue for another day), cert. 
denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999); see also 25 U.S.C. SS 1116(a), 1117(a), 
1118; 2 Gilson S 5.12[1][c][vii]. 
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